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TEXT OP STATUTES 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609(a) (1983) provides: 
RULE 609. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION 
OF CRIME. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking 
the credibility of a witness, evidence that he 
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted 
if elicited from him or established by public 
record during cross-examination but only if the 
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment 
in excess of one year under the law under which 
he was convicted, and the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
STATEMENT OP ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to rule on whether 
a prior felony conviction of the defendant should be allowed into 
evidence until the question was asked before the jury? 
2. Did the trial court err in allowing the prior felony of 
the defendant to be allowed into evidence? 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-26(2)(a)(1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a criminal 
action may take an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from a final 
judgment of conviction of a Class B Misdemeanor by a Circuit Court. 
In the case at hand, final judgment and conviction were rendered by 
the Honorable Judge Sheila K. McCleve, Third Circuit Court, Salt 
Lake Department, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY 
Plaintiff 
V. 
GLEN C. SNYDER, 
Defendant 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
GLEN C. SNYDER appeals from judgment and conviction for 
Destruction of Property, a Class B Misdemeanor, in the Third Circuit 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Sheila K. 
McCleve, Judge, presiding. The matter was tried to a four member 
jury; the jury convicted Mr. Snyder as charged. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The incident charged in the present case occurred in the 
late evening of April 2nd, 1988. Dallas Mullins and a friend, James 
Vansickle, were parked at approximately 10th South and State Street, 
Salt Lake City in front of the AudioTech store. The two youths had 
been on State Street that evening for about three hours. While they 
were parked, a black Cobra Mustang pulled diagonally in front of 
Dallas Mullins* car (T 5). Dallas Mullins testified at trial that 
Glen Snyder, the defendant, got out of the Mustang and ran toward 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 880550-CA 
Priority No. 2 
the victim's car and tried the door handle but the door had been 
locked. When the door wouldn't openf the assailant kicked the 
passenger door window. Dallas Mullins tried backing the car, but 
almost hit a fire hydrant. The assailant came back with a baseball 
bat and hit the windshield (T 5). The windshield glass was 
fractured showering glass on James Vansickle, who was seated in the 
passenger seat (T 8). On cross-examination, Dallas Mullins stated 
that the entire incident took about a minute (T 11) and that he did 
not know who Glen Snyder, the defendant, was prior to his being 
shown Glen Snyder's driver's license picture by police officers and 
that the only times that Dallas Mullins had ever seen the defendant 
was when Dallas Mullins thought Mr. Snyder broke his windshield with 
a baseball bat, and in court at the day of the trial. 
Mr. Snyder took the stand in his own defense and stated 
that he had used his brother's car earlier that day but denied being 
involved in any vandalism (T 15). On cross-examination by the 
prosecution, Mr. Snyder claimed he was in his room at the Carlton 
Hotel until past 1:00 a.m. on the morning after the evening of the 
windshield incident (T 17). 
The prosecution called the passenger of the car, James 
VanSickle, as a rebuttal witness who corroborated Dallas Mullins' 
testimony and identified Mr. Snyder in court as the perpetrator of 
the car vandalism (T 23). 
After hearing testimony and additional evidence, the trial 
court found Mr. Snyder guilty of Destruction of Property, a Class B 
Misdemeanor. Mr. Snyder was sentenced to six months jail with 
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credit for time served on a felony parole revocation and was ordered 
to pay $214.78 restitution on the broken windshield. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to 
rule prior to trial on the defendant's motion whether prior criminal 
convictions of the defendant should be allowed into evidence or 
excluded until the question was asked before the jury. The first 
question asked by the prosecutor of the defendant in 
cross-examination was "Sir, have you ever been convicted of a 
felony?" to which the defendant responded, "yes". This is a case of 
witness identification and the admission to the jury of a felony 
record by the defendant was clearly prejudicial to his credibility 
and his claim that he was not the perpetrator of the crime. 
The trial court should not have allowed the prior felony of 
the defendant into evidence without the prosecution having met its 
burden of establishing that the prior conviction was more probative 
than prejudicial. 
Because the jury believed the prior felony conviction of 
the defendant was admissible for substantive purposes, the jury must 
have taken it into account in reaching its decision. The 
overwhelming prejudicial effect of such information suggests the 
outcome would have been different had the question of a prior felony 
conviction not been asked. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
RULE ON WHETHER THE PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD OF THE 
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED INTO EVIDENCE OR 
EXCLUDED UNTIL THE QUESTION WAS ASKED BEFORE THE 
JURY, 
Prior to trial, defense counsel motioned that the criminal 
record of the defendant be excluded from being admitted into 
evidence (T 1). The prosecution argued that the motion was "very 
premature and until that time arises, I don't think the court can 
make a ruling on it." (T 1). The court ruled that "if they start to 
testify that way, object that it's not responsive and I"11 sustain 
the objection, if they testify to anything that shouldn't be 
admitted." (T 2). 
The first question asked by the prosecution of the 
defendant in cross examination was, "Sir, have you ever been 
convicted of a felony?" to which the defendant answered, "yes". (T 
16). Review of the actual tape of the trial will reveal that the 
prosecutor took a poignant pause before proceeding with the 
remainder of his cross-examination. The trial court's non-decisive 
ruling on defendant's motion to exclude left the door open for the 
prosecution to ask the very incriminating question of a felony 
conviction in front of the jury which was exploited by the 
prosecution in closing argument. 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor recapped the city's 
witnesses' testimonies and then stated, "We therefore have the 
defendant take the stand and tell us his story. Now, the defendant 
tells us that, one; hefs a convicted felon and two; that he never 
really left the Carlton that whole night except for just a couple of 
minutes." (Addendum 2) 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE 
PRIOR FELONY OP THE DEFENDANT TO BE ALLOWED INTO 
EVIDENCE. 
Rule 609(a)(1) (Utah R. Evid. 609, 1983) mandates that an 
accused who testifies in a criminal case on his own behalf can be 
impeached by evidence of his prior felony convictions not involving 
dishonesty or false statement only if the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect (as cited in State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986)). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Banner further outlined five of the 
factors to be considered when balancing probative value against 
prejudicial effect (citing 321 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Rules of Evidence 
§420 (1982): 
[1] The nature of the crime, as bearing on the 
character for veracity of the witness. 
[2] The recentness or remoteness of the prior 
conviction . . . 
[3] The similarity of the prior crime to the 
charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance may 
lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad 
person. 
[4] The importance of credibility issues in 
determining the truth in a prosecution tried 
without decisive nontestimonial evidence . . . 
[5] The importance of the accused testimony, as 
perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions 
probative of the accused character for veracity. 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 at 1334 (Utah 1986). 
No balancing test was ever performed by the court. The 
Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App., 
1988) held that: "The State has the burden of establishing that the 
prior conviction is more probative than prejudicial. (Banner, 717 
P.2d at 1334). . . . Therefore, because the trial court did not 
utilize the Banner criteria and the probative value versus 
prejudicial effect, we find that the court erred in finding the 
prior conviction admissible. State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 19 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
The error in Wight was found to be harmless due to the fact 
that the only part of Wight's testimony which seriously conflicted 
with the view of events propounded by the State was Wight's 
assertion that he was only sleepy, not drunk. That testimony was 
refuted by evidence concerning his blood alcohol content. The 
instant case is distinguishable. The facts offered by the 
prosecution of the actions of Mr. Snyder were in direct conflict 
with where Mr. Snyder claimed to be on April 2, 1988. It is a case 
of identification. The admission by the defendant on 
cross-examination that he was a convicted felon certainly must have 
been taken into consideration by the jury in weighing his 
credibility as a witness to testify in his own behalf. Error is 
reversible "only if a review of the record persuades the court that 
without the error there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the defendant.'" State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 
1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) (quoting State v. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635, 
637 (Utah 1982) as cited in State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 19 (Utah 
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App. 1988). Had Mr. Snyder been able to testify free from the 
stigma to his credibility of being asked whether he had been 
convicted of a felony, there would be a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result for Mr. Snyder. In an eye witness 
identification case, the credibility of the witnesses is an 
important factor in the jury's determination of whether the city 
has met their burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
Glen Snyder respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand the case for a new trial or dismissal of 
the charges. 
Respectfully submitted this I day of June, 1989. 
Lloyd Al Poelman 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
ADDENDUM A 
CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
Salt Lake City vs. Glen Snyder Tape 88-1393 881003180MC 
Prosecution: . . . destroy property, taking a baseball bat to a 
windshield is about as malicious as you can get, unless it's on a 
person's body. But if you're going to destroy property, this is 
what it is and this is what we're dealing with is a property 
(inaudible). And that this conduct occurred in Salt Lake City and 
it occurred on or about April 2, 1988. What the defendant has put 
into issue is that he is not the one, he had been mistaken for 
someone else. So that is the issue to which you must resolve and 
basically comes down to the sole issue, whether or not this person 
is the one who did it or did not do it. That takes us to the 
reasonable doubt instruction and also takes us to the instruction of 
someone who has knowingly testified falsely. Because the reasonable 
doubt of this is you've got one of two stories. You either believe 
the story that the two young men have told you in regards to what 
has taken place and their identification of this individual or you 
say we don't believe them, we believe the defendant and that he was 
not there at the time. So what it comes down to is one of two 
stories, and that's how really the reasonable doubt of this matter 
is to be viewed. Take one of two stories and say I either believe 
it or don't believe it and it's (inaudible). Now as we've gone 
through, you've heard the stories and when I attempted to start, I 
started with Dallas in regard to this, just basically with the 
incident itself. That's my starting point with him because the 
issue that I was not there where he was at was unknown to me. 
(inaudible) what we have in this particular case and describe to you 
the incident. He tells you that about the individual, that he sees 
him, identifies him in the X. No doubt in his mind about what has 
occurred. We thereafter have the defendant take the stand and tell 
us his story. Now, the defendant tells us that, one, he's a 
convicted felon and two that he never really left the Carlton that 
whole night except for just a couple of minutes. Then as he's 
pressed about the matter, "well didn't you go someplace else"? 
"Well, yah I did leave for a few minutes". "Well, where did you 
go"? "Well, no place, I just came back". And his story starts 
changing and it changes about 4 times as we're going through this 
because, of course nothing happens, then he gets stopped for some 
type of moving violation then he goes down and does not go down to 
the vicinity of 550 South State, never meets with an officer, then 
it changes, Oh I went down and I finally did go down and visit my 
brother. Ah, never saw a cop and then Oh yes I did see a cop and I 
guess it was in that vicinity. Ah, of course you walked from a 
building, yes I did. Then the story changes, well no I didn't I 
drove out in my car. So, the story just keeps changing and changing 
and changing. So, you're looking at this, is thia a story that I'm 
going to be believing or a story I'm not going to be believing. 
Then we take a few of the items that are involved here. We've got 
the defendants wallet that's in his brothers coat. It would tend to 
lead to surmise that some particular incident. This person is into 
that vehicle because his wallet is discovered in that vehicle. 2. 
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You've got or he admits at one point that he walked from behind the 
building where his brother has now been parked and the officer has 
talked to the brother, the officer leaves. The officer waits around 
for a few minutes, goes back and who does he see walking from the 
building who's been hiding. He admits that he was hiding at one 
point but then he tells his brother he wasn't hiding from 
destruction of this vehicle. Ah, what we surmise by this was him 
very well surmised that we have a defendant who has done something, 
knows that the cops are going to be looking for him and the cops to 
vicinity, and thinking the cops are gone are not going to be around, 
he can now come out of hiding and proceed to be on his way but yet 
he is met and confronted by the officer. The other people have 
already left the scene. We know that because the identification of 
the individual takes place when the wallet was discovered in the 
car. So, we have the story as it kept changing and as he kept 
telling us and then after we do that we have the defendant tell us 
that he's going driving around in the Ford Galaxy and he hadn't left 
the car before these incidents. Now then I put on the stand, James 
VanSickel who, once again without a doubt, identifies this 
particular person and the identification identical is what we've had 
from Mr. Moen. The type of hair color, everything, the clothes, 
that's when everything takes place. Then we get into a neut a 
little bit. A nuance which was unbeknownst to what was going on 
here. We have Mr. VanSickel who thereafter tells us the fact he had 
actually seen this particular defendant driving around in a Ford 
Galaxy and seeing him three times that night, not knowing that that 
was anything for which (inaudible) needed to discuss with us. Not 
only that, but we have Mr. VanSickel who tells us that he is 
definitely going around and seen three different times on that 
night. The defendant telling us that he hadn't left the Carlton, 
not at all and the defendant as it turns out drives that Ford Galaxy 
that was seen. In fact, he knows how it is because he knows the 
girl that's with, though he doesn't know the defendant, he knows the 
girl that was with the defendant. So all of the City submits to you 
leaves us only one conclusion and that's the fact that the story 
that the defendant is telling is not credible. It's not believable 
and it's not the truth. That the defendant, in fact, is the person 
who smashed the window of this particular vehicle at that time and 
that location on South State and we would ask that you find the 
defendant guilty in this matter. Thank you very much. 
Judge: Mr. Poelman. 
Mr Poelman: At the beginning of the trial I told you to listen 
carefully to what the two witnesses that the city were going to call 
would be saying regarding the identification of who they want to 
charge with this crime. The questions I want you to ask yourself 
are: are you convinced that the identification identifying Mr. 
Snyder today or was it because they were prompted by his driver's 
license being shown to him by the police officers. Also, ask 
yourself if it isn't a fact that every time they've identified Mr. 
Snyder, it 's been under a proceeding of either a police officer 
showing the ID or him being here in court today. They must assume 
that the person who they identified originally as the right one. 
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Also consider the fact that as the credibility of the testimony goes 
that the fact that Mr. Snyder was confused as to the name of the 
officer who pulled him over doesn't mean that he doesn't have an 
accurate recollection of the fact that he did not hit the car 
windshield with a baseball bat. He did say that he spoke with the 
officer, that he didn't know his name and that was the new name that 
he was being hit with today. I can understand somebody not having a 
recollection of that, but when he was asked directly, did you get 
out of the car, did you perform this act, his answer is no. Also, 
his response to the question, what was your hair like at that time, 
he says slightly longer than it is now. What was the color? Both 
of the witnesses wanted to say that it's darker than it is right 
now. The recollection as to some of the details was there but some 
of it wasn't. They could remember that this person was wearing 
levis, couldn't remember the color of his shirt. They could 
remember that a shirt was being worn. Mr. Snyder's testimony fits 
in that his brother did tell him when he spoke with his brother, 
"watch out, the police are looking for you, you've been ID as 
somebody as somebody the police are after." But he didn't know 
anything about the incident until he spoke with his brother. He 
stated that he wasn't riding around with his brother in that black 
Cobra that night, that he had been in the car earlier that day, well 
before one or two and that's when his wallet was left in the car. 
If the wallet hadn't been found by the police and shown to the two 
witnesses today, it's questionable of whether they would have been 
able to identify him here today. The burden you have is to convict 
Mr. Snyder of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He has a presumption 
of innocence. You have to weigh the evidence that's true. I'm 
suggesting to you that Mr. Snyder may have been perfect on his 
recollection of all the details but he did recall the fact that he 
did not pick up a baseball bat that evening and smash in a car 
window. That he's testified to. I question also how thorough the 
witnesses and how certain they could be on an incident that took 
place that fast. To believe them myself, I would have appreciated a 
little more hesitancy. For them to say, No I'm quite certain, 
rather than I'm absolutely positive. I would say, with their 
(inaudible) flying, cars backing up, almost hitting fire hydrants, 
windows at the sides of doors being kicked that there isn't 
necessarily an ability of a person to have an absolute recollection 
of what a person looks like. I don't doubt that the witnesses 
believe that it's Mr. Snyder who performed this act. But I believe 
that their testimony was refreshed in a way that wasn't accurate. 
They were shown a driver's license by the police and said isn't this 
the man? They were brought into court today and said," Isn't this 
the man?" I don't doubt that they believe that this is the man, but 
I don't think that the city has proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mr. Snyder is that man. Thank you. 
Judge; Mr. Ludlow. 
Prosecution: Thank you, your honor. One of the items to which we 
had here is that when the incident occurred, as they informed you, 
especially Mr. VanSickel, that he had given a description to the 
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officer as to who had done this particular incident. He described 
him and the police thereafter giving the ID on the Driver's license, 
to which he says this is the one, that's exactly who he saw. Now 
they've described it to him. The counsel is trying to suggest that 
the idea of who's doing it is being put in her mind by the officer. 
It's the other way around. They're telling the officer who's doing 
it. The officer shows them, "this is the one?" "Yes this is the 
one." It's just the opposite of what counsel suggests. You have a 
question here as to whether or not the defendant has told us the 
truth, told us a credible story. We submit that it is not the 
truth, it is not a credible story. He is, in fact the one who has 
done this particular incident. He has been identified, positive, in 
regards to what occurred. We have some people who've seen him at 
night and have someone who is in the situation where they are 
viewing someone who is taking a baseball bat and swinging it right 
at them. Face it, you're not going to forget. I submit that what 
has occurred here has been done by the defendant and the city 
requests that you find the defendant guilty. Thank you very much. 
Judge: Do you solemly swear that you'll take this jury to a private 
and convenient place to deliberate and not allow anyone to 
communicate with them, including yourself until a verdict has been 
reached and then return with them when a verdict has been reached. 
All rise and we'll excuse the jury. 
(Jury excused). 
Judge: All right, has the, have the jurors appointed a foreman? 
Juror: Yes. 
Judge: And who is that, Mre Wolf, All right and has the jury 
reached a verdict? 
Juror: Yes, your honor. 
Judge: If you would, my clerk will receive that from you, she'll go 
over and get that. Please hand that to her. Mr. Poelman, let's 
have you stand with the defendant, Mr. Snyder and I'll read the 
verdict to you. In the case of Salt Lake City vs. Glen C. Snyder, 
we the jurors in the above case find the defendant guilty of 
destruction of property. Do you wish to have the jury polled. 
Mr. Poelman: I would. 
Judge: Then let me just go through that and ask if that is your 
verdict, Mr. Wolf? 
Mr. Wolf: Yes it is. 
Judge: Mr. Sewell? 
Mr. Sewell: Yes it was. 
Judge: Mr. Jenson? 
Mr. Jenson: Yes. 
Judge: Ms. Williams? 
Ms. Williams: Yes. 
Judge: Alright, thank you. You may be seated counsel and we will 
again thank you jurors for your attendance for your attendance here 
today, the service that you've rendered, your attentiveness, and 
your deliberations. You may be excused at this time and you're free 
to go if you wish or then again you can remain behind the bar. 
Thank you for your service. And, Mr. Poelman, of course defendant 
has the right to be sentenced at a later time or you can waive that 
and I can sentence him today, whatever you prefer. 
Mr. Poelman; We would ask to be sentenced now and waive that right 
to be sentenced later. 
Judge: All right, let's have him come up to the podium. Let me ask 
Mr. Ludlow first if we have an estimate on the restitution? 
Mr. Ludlow: Yes, your honor, we do. 
Judge: What, while Mr. Ludlow's looking for that. 
Mr. Ludlow: At Ray's glass, the amount of the damage is $214.78 and 
at Double A Auto Glass Inc., it was $250.25. You can take the 
lesser. 
Judge: $214.78, OK. 
Mr. Ludlow: If I also, the city has . . 
Judge: Sentencing recommendations? 
Mr. Ludlow: A rap sheet on the defendant. He has an extensive 
criminal history. Ah . . 
Judge: What's he serving time now for? 
Mr. Poelman: It's a parole violation on an escape. 
Judge: What was the original? 
Mr. Poelman: It was attempted burglary. 
Mr. Ludlow: Well, he's a burglary in 6 months, he's had a theft 
charge which he went for one year then escaped from the prison, then 
they keep adding up. 
Judge: Did the city have a recommendation then? 
Mr. Ludlow: Your honor, we believe the defendant to be a very 
dangerous destructive individual. We would ask for a maximum 
sentence on this. I usually don't ask for that, but in this 
defendant's case, I would. 
Judge: Any recommendation as to . . 
Mr. Ludlow: We would also ask for the restitution on that. 
Judge: Go ahead, Mr. Poelman. 
Mr. Poelman: Mr. Snyder's does have a criminal record, he's out at 
the prison, that's where he's at now. Yah, he's been serving out 
there already because of this parole violation when he was arrested 
for that they sent him back to the prison. And I think he's already 
basically served some time on this even though he hasn't been 
sentenced yet because if it were not for this arrest that he 
wouldn't have been back to the prison that he has . . 
Judge: So the arrest was the reason for the revocation? 
Mr. Poelman: of parole, that's right. He's got a parole review at 
the end of Julye I would ask that he be given credit for some of 
that time that he has already served because of his revocation on 
the parole directly related to this. Of course, we would accept the 
restitution given at (inaudible) 
Judge: So we don't know how long he's going to be out to the prison 
yet until he has a hearing at the end of July on the revocation? 
Mr. Poelman: That's right. 
Judge: Well, I'm concerned I guess mostly about the restitution. 
If I were to give him credit for time served and allow it to run 
concurrent and order the restitution, I suppose I want to have some 
assurance that the restitution will be paid. I don't have any idea 
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how long hefs going to be out to the prison. It's difficult for me 
to sentence, to determine whether to sentence concurrently or 
consecutively. What's the date of the hearing out at the prison 
again, July, end of July? 
Mr. Poelman: July 20th. 
Judge: And it's on a burgl. . It must be a burglary. 
Mr. Poelman: He claims that it was the escape, that his original 
charge was attempted burglary but that the escape was the felony. 
Judge: I've got a conviction here for a burglary in 85 and then the 
escape in 87? Is that accurate with what he said? 
Mr. Poelman: right. 
Judge: And then a Class B theft in 88. 
Mr. Poelman: Does that show a conviction on the burglary cause it 
says. . 
Judge: It shows a conviction on the burglary, urn hum. It says 
conviction. That's not what he recalls? 
Mr. Snyder: That's not what happened at all. It was dropped in a 
bargain that I plead to the attempted escape. 
Mr. Ludlow: Your honor, there's another one down there further that 
shows that there was another burglary to which there, a burglary or 
a theft, there was a dismissal. 
Judge: That's right, there are a couple of burglaries. 
Mr. Ludlow: I think he's misconfusing or I should say that he is 
confusing some of his other acts for the ones which he has been 
found guilty. There are two crimes to which he has on there, one is 
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a theft, one of which the city reads it as being a one year 
conviction on that. The other which is a burglary for which a 6 
month sentence was given for that together with his escape. 
Judge: Well, Mr, Poelman if you have some other corrections that 
you want to make, I guess I could give you the time to do that and 
we could have the defendant brought back out and I could sentence 
him at a later time. If you don't want to do that, I'll to ahead 
and sentence now. 
Mr. Poelman: Yah, what we might recommend then would be the 
sentencing could be after the 20th and then the court would know 
what the parole board did and would have a better idea of knowing. 
Judge: Let me just get again for the record. The city recommends, 
with respect to sentencing, that the full 6 months be imposed, that 
restitution be ordered and that the sentence be ordered, you didn't 
recommend concurrent or consecutive, did you? 
Mr. Ludlow: No I did not, your honor, whatever the court feels 
would be appropriate. 
Judge: OK. Let me tell you, Mr. Poelman, I'm considering for Mr. 
Snyder whether to run it consecutive or concurrently and again the 
issue with the court primarily of concern if the restitution amount, 
the amount of restitution to be paid. I'll wait and see what the 
parole board does and whether he's revoked and for how long he's 
going to be in the state prison whether that sentence that I impose 
for him after that or concurrent with it. Urn. . 
Mr. Ludlow: May the city for clarification, so we do not run into 
problem. The defendant will be waiving his time period to be 
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sentenced within the 10 days. Is that what is taking place here, 
between 2 and 10 days because the 20th is going to be beyond 
sentencing time. 
Judge: Yah, yah. You waived the time period and after the parole. 
Mr. Poelman: Yah, that would be better. 
Judge: Is that what he wants to do? 
Mr. Poelman: That's what you want to do right? 
Judge: All right, I'll let him do that and set it for after the 
20th and Does he have a, was he out on probation to A.P.& P., when 
he was out on parole, did he have a parole officer through A.P.& P. 
or corrections or? 
Mr. Poelman: Because what I would accept is a previous ah, I'm 
going to order a presentence from A.P.&P. so that I can get the 
records straight and have the rap sheet and I'll just get some more 
information and you can get the further information to me but we'll 
get it clarified on his record. And I would accept whatever they've 
got previously with the follow-up. So if we know who his parole 
officer was, does he remember the name of his parole officer? 
Mr. Ludlow: Was it Maurice Eskavar. 
Mr. Poelman: Maurice Eskavar. 
Judge: Eskavar, all right we'll make a note that it's Eskavar that 
was his parole officer previously and refer it to A.P. & P. for a 
presentence report and I'll use that report with an update. That 
would be acceptable and then we'll sentence him on August 8th at, is 
the afternoon easier for the prison, transport either way? Well 
let's do it at 9:00 then. Monday, August 8th at 9:00 for sentencing. 
Mr. Poelman; Do I need to make arrangements to have him talk to his 
parole officer or . . . 
Judge: We'll make a note in the referral over there but you can 
follow up on that as well. And I'll sentence him that day on the 
information that I have so if there's something you want to correct 
or add, have it to me by then. That will be the order of the courtf 
we'll be in recess. 
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